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SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: 2006 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

REF: STATE 175925

11. (SBU) Per ref request, Post provides Tajikistan's 2006 country report on terrorism.

12. (SBU) Sharing a 1,400-kilometer border with Afghanistan, Tajikistan is well aware of the negative effects of state-sponsored terrorism and offered its limited resources to assist the United States almost unconditionally. Following the deployment of U.S. troops to Afghanistan, Tajikistan allowed its territory and air space to be used for counterterrorist actions. The Tajik Government's main impediment to counterterrorism performance remains its lack of resources. The fact that Tajikistan remains the poorest of all the former Soviet republics, and per GDP the ninth poorest country in the world, puts these funding issues into context. There were no terrorist acts committed against U.S. citizens in Tajikistan during 2006.

13. (SBU) While Tajikistan is not known to harbor any terrorist groups, some analysts believe that extremists transit Tajikistan to and from Afghanistan and Pakistan. While the 1,400 kilometer Tajik-Afghan border is porous, the border guards are slowly working to control it. The U.S. Government spent over \$5.8 million in 2006 to train and equip the Tajik Border Guards in order to increase their border-patrolling capabilities; these programs were implemented through International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), Export, Customs and Border Security Assistance (EXBS) Office, and the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC). These border fortifications and related capacity-building assistance will help stem the flow of potential terrorists attempting to cross the border and allow Tajikistan to better monitor its own borders.

14. (SBU) Within the framework of the war on terrorism, Tajikistan prohibited extremist-oriented activities and closely monitored terrorist groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and extremist groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). HT, an extremist political movement advocating the establishment of a theocratic Islamic state throughout the entire Muslim world. The Government of Tajikistan believes HT is also active in Tajikistan, particularly in the northern part of the country, which is a part of the Fergana Valley.. In May 2006, a small group of armed bandits attacked Tajik and Kyrgyz border posts. The fighters killed and seized several weapons, including 17 Kalashnikov assault rifles, a PK light machine-gun and 3,000 rounds of ammunition. The date of the attack coincided with the one-year anniversary of the Andijan uprising in Uzbekistan, which led authorities to believe that the IMU was responsible for these attacks. Kyrgyz security services killed four militants during the attack and arrested one other. Tajik authorities later convicted seven IMU members for their participation in the attacks.

15. (SBU) While the United States has no evidence that HT has committed acts of international terrorism, the group's radical

anti-American and anti-Semitic ideology is sympathetic to acts of violence against the United States and its allies. In 2005, approximately 74 members of HT were arrested and 44 HT activists arrested the previous year were convicted and sentenced to prison terms of three to 20 years. A recent press report stated that Tajik authorities have arrested 56 alleged HT members this year in Tajikistan. While the final statistics are not yet available, the Tajik legal system has convicted at least 32 of these suspects (nineteen men and thirteen women).

¶6. (SBU) The Tajik government does not keep a list of declared terrorist organizations.

¶7. (SBU) Tajikistan participated in the counterterrorist activities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Commonwealth Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the CIS Counterterrorist Center.

¶8. (SBU) Analysts also believe that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) also operates in Tajikistan. Recent press reports indicate that Tajik authorities arrested 30 suspect IMU members in Tajikistan in 2006; figures are not available regarding how many of them have been convicted. There is also an ongoing trial of 11 alleged IMU members in Dushanbe, who are accused of organizing January and June 2005 terrorist bombings in Dushanbe, both of which occurred outside the Ministry of Emergency Situations. One of the defendants is a member of the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), the officially-recognized Islamic opposition party. Tajik authorities also arrested five additional alleged IMU members in Isfara; during a search of their house, police claim that they found 80 kilograms of ammoniac nitrate and four kilograms of aluminum powder.

¶9. (SBU) Post's point of contact for this report is Political Officer James Ricker, rickerjb@state.gov, phone 992-37-229-2507,

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